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PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR POSTURE: 
SECURITY AND SURVIVABILITY 
Peter R. Lavoy1 
 
This paper examines Pakistan’s strategy for ensuring the security and survivability of its 
nuclear deterrent during periods of peace, crisis, and war. Toward this end, five main features of 
Pakistan’s strategic deterrence policy are described in some detail. With an understanding of how 
Pakistani military planners perceive the basic requirements of their strategic deterrent, the ways 
in which the rapidly evolving United States-India strategic partnership threatens Pakistan’s core 
defense precepts become apparent. A set of new long-term Pakistani strategic concerns 
stimulated by the expanding U.S.-India partnership is identified and analyzed. The basic point is 
that projected developments in India’s nuclear and conventional military capabilities eventually 
could threaten the survivability of Pakistan’s strategic deterrent, which has always been a major 
concern for the country’s defense planners. The concluding section of the paper examines how 
the Pakistan government officials might view three emerging strategic threats posed by India and 
its expanding international partnerships. 
 
Five Dimensions of Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy 
Pakistan has relied on nuclear weapons to deter Indian aggression for over two decades, 
but a thoroughly considered and planned nuclear deterrence strategy took shape only after the 
country conducted its first nuclear explosive tests in May 1998—a development that was 
prompted suddenly and unexpectedly by India’s surprise nuclear test series earlier that month. 
Before then, nuclear weapons had not been integrated into Pakistani military plans; the armed 
forces had no nuclear employment doctrine to speak of, and command and control over the 
nuclear arsenal and delivery systems was only vaguely defined and loosely organized.2 Even 
after the 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistani defense planners gradually recognized that premising 
national security on nuclear weapons required a multitude of new undertakings related to 
doctrine, command and control, force structure, delivery systems, and the vetting and training of 
specialized personnel assigned to various strategic force responsibilities. 
Pakistan’s efforts to establish an effective nuclear force posture, strategic organization, 
use doctrine, deterrence strategy, and command and control system were severely complicated, 
but also ultimately facilitated, by three serious crises that occurred in the past five years: (1) the 
forced reorientation of Pakistan’s foreign and defense policies after the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks against the United States and the subsequent U.S.-led war on terrorism; (2) the 
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2001-2002 military standoff that nearly produced a major war with India; and (3) the revelations 
in early 2003 of the A. Q. Khan network’s illicit transfers of nuclear weapons technology and 
materials to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Because of the sweeping changes Pakistan has made 
in its nuclear programs, strategic organizations, and force posture in the wake of these traumatic 
events, Pakistani security planners now have a much more effective—and “normal”—nuclear 
deterrence posture. However, the emergence of new political and military challenges arising 
from the U.S.-India strategic partnership—particularly, the U.S.-India initiative for civilian 
nuclear cooperation and possible defense technology and military equipment transfers—will 
further test the ability of Pakistan’s military leadership to maintain a robust, credible, and secure 
nuclear deterrent. 
Today, Pakistan’s strategic deterrence strategy consists of five major elements: (1) an 
effective conventional fighting force and the demonstrated resolve to employ it against a wide 
range of conventional and sub-conventional threats; (2) a minimum nuclear deterrence doctrine 
and force posture; (3) an adequate stockpile of nuclear weapons and delivery systems to provide 
for an assured second strike; (4) a survivable strategic force capable of withstanding sabotage, 
conventional military attacks, and at least one enemy nuclear strike; and (5) a robust strategic 
command and control apparatus designed to ensure tight negative use control during peacetime 
and prompt operational readiness (positive control) at times of crisis and war. Each of these 
features is described below. 
 
Conventional-Military Components of Deterrence 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are considered to be absolutely essential to deter India from 
undertaking a wide range of coercive political-military behavior that could undermine Pakistan’s 
territorial integrity and political sovereignty. However, it is important to recognize that Pakistani 
defense planners still consider their conventional armed forces to be the first line of defense 
against Indian conventional military attack and the backbone of the country’s overall deterrence 
posture. It could be said that 95 percent of Pakistan’s strategic deterrent relies on a robust 
conventional military capability and deliberate and repeated demonstrations of the Pakistan 
leadership’s readiness to employ it decisively if attacked—or even seriously threatened with 
military attack. 
Pakistan’s military conduct during the 2001-2002 crisis with India revealed this 
orientation. When India mobilized its armed forces for attack shortly after the 13 December 2001 
terrorist strike against the Indian Parliament, Pakistan responded by immediately putting its own 
armed forces on a war footing. Pakistani military leaders were very satisfied that their ground 
forces were able to reach their designated strike positions more quickly than their opposite 
numbers, thus eliminating the element of surprise and nullifying any advantage that India might 
have by striking across the border first. It is widely speculated that Indian Prime Minister Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee decided against a military attack when his troops had moved into their strike 
positions by the middle of January because Pakistani troop deployments indicated that Islamabad 
was well prepared to counter-strike at locations of its choosing, thus eliminating any advantage 
India would have gained by attacking first. As President Pervez Musharraf wrote in his memoir, 
“We went through a period of extreme tension throughout 2002, when Indian troops amassed on 
our borders during a hair-trigger, eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation. We responded by moving all 
 3
our forces forward. The standoff lasted ten months. Then the Indians blinked and quite 
ignominiously agreed to a mutual withdrawal of forces.”3 
A similar experience in coercive diplomacy occurred a few months later, when Indian 
and Pakistani troops were still fully deployed along the international border and the Kashmir line 
of control. When the Pakistan leadership received tactical intelligence that India once again was 
preparing to attack in early June 2002, the Pakistan military command’s response was to instruct 
its soldiers to counterattack immediately after the first Indian violation of the international 
border. Not only that, but following the traditional approach of Pakistani deterrence strategy, 
orders were given for at least one additional counter-attack to take place in reaction to the Indian 
strike.4 By demonstrating its readiness to use conventional military force in response to any 
Indian provocation, Pakistan hoped then, and still hopes today, to compensate for its 
disadvantage relative to India in conventional troop numbers and equipment quality with greater 
resolve and the willingness to run greater military risks.5 
If an Indo-Pakistani military crisis were to deepen, the weight of deterrence would shift 
more to nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s nuclear posture, which during peacetime is recessed and 
structured mainly for secrecy and safety, would reflect a much greater emphasis on usability and 
operational readiness. Of course, this is what senior Pakistani defense planners have referred to 
when they express concern about the degradation of Pakistan’s conventional military capability 
lowering the threshold for nuclear weapons use: the shorter the period of time that Pakistan’s 
conventional military (notably the Pakistan Army and Air Force) could hold out in a war, the 
quicker the National Command Authority (NCA) would be to order the deployment—and 
possibly the employment—of nuclear weapons. 
A key point that emerges from this understanding of the close connection of conventional 
military force and nuclear force in Pakistan’s deterrence strategy is the realization that escalation 
dominance at all rungs of the military ladder—from low-intensity conflict to conventional war 
and all the way to nuclear war—is deemed absolutely essential for the weaker power to survive. 
Pakistani defense planners firmly believe that if they allow India to seize the advantage at any 
level of violence—from sub-conventional through conventional to nuclear warfare—then India is 
sure to exploit it, and all will be lost. 
 
Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Doctrine 
Pakistan has not formally declared a nuclear employment doctrine. But this does not 
mean there is no doctrine. On the contrary, Pakistan has operational plans and requirements for 
nuclear use integrated within its military war-fighting plans. In contrast to India, which has stated 
the basic parameters of its nuclear use doctrine but remains quiet about its strategic command 
and control structure, Pakistan has disclosed the basic features of its nuclear command and 
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control organization,6 but no official has discussed how the government plans to employ its 
nuclear weapons. In fact, Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, director of Pakistan’s Strategic 
Plans Division (SPD)—the military organization created in 1999 to oversee the development, 
custody, and employment of nuclear weapons—affirmed to a pair of Italian physicists in 2002 
that Pakistan would not make its nuclear doctrine public, as India did in August 1999.7 
The primary purpose of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, which Pakistani officials have openly 
stated, is to deter an Indian conventional military attack. As noted above, Pakistan prioritizes 
conventional military readiness for deterrence and war fighting. If this fails, Pakistani officials 
plan to be the first to use nuclear weapons as last resort to prevent the loss of Pakistan’s territory, 
or the military defeat of the Pakistan armed forces. In the most authoritative statement on the 
subject, Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar indicated in June 2001 that the government had 
adopted “minimum credible deterrence as the guide to [its] nuclear program.8 
Planning for how and under what circumstances Pakistan’s nuclear weapons would be 
employed has been only broadly outlined over the years. As early as December 1974, Prime 
Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto declared for the first time the basic principle of Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons use policy. He stated: “Ultimately, if our backs are to the wall and we have absolutely 
no option, in that event, this decision about going nuclear will have to be taken.”9 
Three decades later, at the peak of 2002 crisis, when Indian and Pakistani forces were 
deployed against each other in a military standoff unprecedented in duration and intensity, 
President Pervez Musharraf repeated Bhutto’s policy formulation. Musharraf stated in an 
interview published in April 2002 in the German magazine, Der Spiegel: “Nuclear weapons are 
the last resort. I am optimistic and confident that we can defend ourselves with conventional 
means, even though the Indians are buying up the most modern weapons in a megalomaniac 
frenzy.” Nuclear weapons could be used, Musharraf said. “If Pakistan is threatened with 
extinction, then the pressure of our countrymen would be so big that this option, too, would have 
to be considered.” In a crisis, he said, nuclear weapons also have to be part of the calculation.10 
In a rare departure from established procedure, Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai 
selectively removed some of the traditional ambiguity over the circumstances in which Pakistani 
defense planners have thought about the employment of nuclear weapons. As the military crisis 
deepened with India in January 2002, Kidwai told a pair of Italian physicists that Pakistani 
nuclear weapons would be used only “if the very existence of Pakistan as a state is at stake.” 
                                                 
6 See “National Command Authority Established,” Associated Press of Pakistan, 3 February 2000, available at 
http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/2000/000203-pak-app1.htm. 
7 See Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in 
Pakistan,” Concise Report of a Visit by Landau Network - Centro Volta, 21 January 2002, 
http://lxmi.mi.infn.it/~landnet. Kidwai reiterated this point in a 27 October 2007 address to the Center for 
Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. For a summary of the talk, see 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/news/kidwaiNov06.asp. 
8 Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, keynote address at Carnegie International Non-proliferation conference, 
18 June 2001, http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/Conference%202001/sattar.htm. 
9 Reported in The Pakistan Times, 1, 27 December 1974. 
10 Roger Boyes, “Musharraf Warns India He May Use Nuclear Weapons,” Times Online, 8 April 2002, available at 
http://www.nci.org/02/04f/08-06.htm. 
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Kidwai elaborated: “Nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India. In case that deterrence fails, they 
will be used if: 
a. India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory (space threshold); 
b. India destroys a large part either of its land or air forces (military threshold); 
c. India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan (economic strangling); 
d. India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large-scale internal 
subversion in Pakistan (domestic destabilization).”11 
The last two elements of the four nuclear use triggers are fuzzy and should not be 
considered in isolation. They are offshoots or preludes to a conventional war that India might 
undertake. In this respect, “economic strangulation” chiefly implies an Indian naval blockade or 
possibly also the placement of Indian dams on rivers flowing from Kashmir that could be used 
either to dry up or flood Pakistan’s Punjab plains, depending on how India’s military operations 
were to unfold. Similarly, “ethnic conflict” is a redline peculiar to South Asia. In Pakistan, this is 
seen as a threat to national survival reminiscent of India’s assistance to the Mukti Bahini 
guerrillas that led to the breakdown of Pakistan’s control over East Pakistan in 1971 and 
subsequently resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. Pakistani apprehension over Indian-abetted 
ethnic conflict also derives from memories of Indian machinations in Pakistan’s Sindh province 
in the 1980s, which were believed to have been conducted as a quid pro quo for Pakistan’s 
alleged support to the Sikh insurgency in Indian Punjab. This concern is exacerbated today by 
Pakistani allegations of Indian complicity (via Afghanistan) in the ongoing ethnic crises in the 
two states of Pakistan that border Afghanistan: Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province. 
Pakistan is unlikely to bring nuclear weapons directly into play in such a scenario (though a 
naval blockade is an act of war), as they could not play any credible role in resolving the crisis. 
But any conventional force posturing in conjunction with this will certainly up the ante. 
Pakistan’s official position is that the main function of its nuclear arsenal is to prevent 
India from destroying or otherwise overwhelming the country. However, the precise Indian 
actions that are interpreted as posing an existential threat have not been articulated. Kidwai’s 
four existential threats for possible use are credible, but also vague. The statement was almost 
certainly intended to be imprecise so as to enhance Pakistani deterrence. If Pakistan were more 
explicit about nuclear red lines, this might enable India to adjust the scope of its strategic plans 
and military operations accordingly. By not specifying the precise Indian actions that would 
trigger Pakistan’s use of nuclear weapons, Pakistani defense planners hope to create uncertainty 
in the minds of Indian policymakers as to how far they can press Pakistan on the battlefield. 
The second objective of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons policy is to deter an overwhelming 
Indian conventional military attack against Pakistan’s armed forces. Islamabad considers that 
India’s advantages in geography and nearly all categories of conventional military capability 
                                                 
11 Pakistani military officials subsequently informed the authors of the Landau report that General Kidwai’s remarks 
on what would trigger a Pakistani nuclear reaction were “purely academic.” The officials stated: “These are matters 
which as elsewhere, are primarily the responsibility of the political leadership of the day. . . . The elaborate 
command and control mechanisms introduced with the establishment of the National Command Authority which is 
Chaired by the Head of State and assisted by political and civilian leaders . . . ensure the highest level of 
responsibility and due deliberation on all matters of strategic importance.” See Cotta-Ramusino and Martellini, 
“Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan.” 
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make nuclear force indispensable for Pakistan’s defense. Pakistani military officials believe that 
clearly communicated resolve to use nuclear weapons and a robust conventional military posture 
are the key requirements for effective deterrence. In their view, one would not work without the 
other. According to this logic, if India attacks, Pakistan would counter-attack with conventional 
forces; each side would inflict significant damage on the other; and India would be forced to 
refrain from escalating the conflict out of a fear of Pakistan’s nuclear response.  
 The conviction that nuclear force is required to augment Pakistan’s conventional military 
deterrence of a possible Indian conventional attack is reinforced by the common perception 
among Pakistani elites that Pakistan successfully deterred attacks by India on at least six 
occasions—during military the crises of 1984-85, 1986-87, 1990, 1998, 1999, and 2001-2002.12 
This interpretation gained even more credibility in light of President Musharraf’s December 
2002 statement that war with India was averted because of his repeated warnings that if Indian 
forces crossed the border, Pakistan would not restrict its response to conventional warfare.13 
Despite the fact that war was only narrowly averted in 2002, Pakistani military planners now 
appear to have even greater confidence in their ability to manage the risks of strategic deterrence. 
The Pakistan government’s approach to employing nuclear weapons thus rests on a 
calculation of its vulnerability to India’s conventional and nuclear forces, and even to India’s 
possible use of non-military instruments to threaten Pakistan’s territorial integrity, political 
stability, and economic viability (as per Kidwai’s reference to economic strangling and domestic 
destabilization). Armed with few viable defense options apart from its expanding nuclear arsenal, 
and ever concerned about such wide-ranging threats, Pakistan is likely to continue to embrace a 
flexible and non-specified doctrine for using nuclear weapons. 
If at all possible, Pakistan does not intend to fight India with nuclear weapons. Pakistani 
civilian and military policymakers recognize that their government and perhaps even their 
country are not likely to survive a nuclear exchange with India. But operational military plans 
must include all contingencies. Pakistan’s targeting policy probably includes a mix of counter-
value and counter-force targets. At present, Pakistan has nuclear-capable F-16 and Mirage 5 
aircraft, which have limited range and penetration capability. Pakistani ballistic missiles, both 
liquid and solid fuel, can reach key strategic points in India. Cruise missiles also have been tested 
and gradually will be integrated into operational plans. Pakistan’s strategic development strategy 
includes continuous research experiments and flight-tests to improve the accuracy and 
penetrability of existing nuclear delivery systems. Pakistan’s nuclear use doctrine probably calls 
for holding multiple Indian industrial centers, military-industrial complexes, defense facilities, 
and military bases and formations at risk. Should India push Pakistan to the brink—whether by 
attacking, occupying, destroying, or strangling—Pakistan’s National Command Authority could 
very well decide to use nuclear weapons. 
                                                 
12 Agha Shahi, Zulfiqar Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar, "Securing Nuclear Peace," The News International, 5 October 
1999; “Are Pakistani Nukes More Effective Than Indian?” Daily Times (Lahore), 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_13-12-2002_pg1_11. 
13 Musharraf did not specify the nuclear threat in his speech to an army corps reunion in Karachi, but he did state 
that he was prepared to act decisively at the height of 2002 crisis: “In my meetings with various world leaders, I 
conveyed my personal message to Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee that the moment Indian forces cross the Line of 
Control and the international border, then they should not expect a conventional war from Pakistan. I believe my 
message was effectively conveyed to Mr. Vajpayee.” “India Was Warned of Unconventional War,” The News 
International, 31 December 2002, available at http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2002/12/30/5s.html. 
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Nuclear Weapons Stockpile and Delivery Systems 
Pakistan’s nuclear force requirement is a tightly held national secret. Islamabad’s stated 
goal is to maintain a credible minimum deterrent, defined primarily around Pakistan’s 
assessment of India’s nuclear force inventory, penetrability and targeting requirements, and 
unspecified future adversaries and contingencies. In addition, Pakistani decision-making for its 
strategic force structure is based on the requirements of survivability, which include a 
sufficiently large weapons stockpile to ensure dispersal to multiple launch sites and a second-
strike capability. A key strategic consideration thus is the maintenance of “sufficient” fissile 
stock material as well as the creation and operation of fissile material production facilities with 
adequate capacity to meet both short-term and long-term requirements. 
 According to public estimates of Pakistan’s fissile material stockpile at the end of 2006, 
Islamabad probably had amassed between 30 and 85 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium from 
its Khushab research reactor and between 1300 and 1700 kilograms of weapon-grade highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) from the Kahuta gas centrifuge facility. The Khushab reactor probably 
can produce between 10 and 15 kilograms of plutonium per year. Kahuta may be able to produce 
100 kilograms of HEU each year. Assuming that Pakistani scientists require 5 to 7 kilograms of 
plutonium to make one warhead, and 20 to 25 kilograms of HEU to produce a bomb, then 
Pakistan would have accumulated enough fissile material to be able to manufacture between 70 
and 115 nuclear weapons by the end of 2006.14 A medium estimate based on these figures would 
mean that Pakistan could have an arsenal of about 90 weapons, as indicated in table 1. 
 
Pakistani Fissile Material & Nuclear Weapons (end of 2006) 
 Low Medium High 
Weapon-Grade Plutonium (kg) 30 55 85 
Weapon-Grade Uranium (kg) 1300 1500 1700 
Weapon Capability 70 90 115 
Table 1 Pakistani Fissile Material and Nuclear Weapons 
 
 In Pakistan’s normal peacetime force posture, nuclear weapons are believed not to be 
deployed. That is, they are not mated with their delivery systems. Nuclear warheads and missile 
delivery systems probably are stored in secure locations that are separate from one another—but 
not too far apart. Delivery aircraft of course are located at one or more of the country’s ten major 
                                                 
14 Institute for Science and International Security, “Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials,” 12 July 2005, 
revised 7 September 2005, http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/tableofcontents.html. A separate study 
by a team of Indian and Pakistani analysts puts Pakistan’s plutonium inventory slightly higher (90 kilograms) and its 
HEU holding slightly lower (1300 kilograms). Zia Mian, A. H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, and M. V. Ramana, “Fissile 
Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” International Panel on Fissile Materials 
Research Report No. 1 (September 2006), p. 3, 
http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmresearchreport01.pdf. 
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air bases or ten forward operating air bases. In the past five years, Pakistan has started to set up 
strategic forces in all three services, two of which (land and air), are presently functional. 
 Pakistan relies on a combination of aircraft and ballistic missiles for nuclear delivery 
missions. Two aircraft in its inventory, the U.S.-supplied F-16 Fighting Falcon multi-role fighter 
and the French Mirage 5PA are particularly well suited to this role. At present, Pakistan has 
about 50 Mirage 5’s and 35 1980s-vintage F-16s, although at the end of 2006 the United States 
agreed to provide mid-life upgrades for Pakistan’s existing F-16s and to transfer another 18 
models to the Pakistan Air Force.15 
 With nonproliferation sanctions severely curtailing Pakistan’s ability to modernize its air 
force during the 1990s, Islamabad went on a major campaign to procure technology and parts for 
a variety of ballistic missiles for nuclear delivery roles. Today, Pakistan possesses a missile force 
comprising road and rail mobile solid-fuel missiles (Abdali, Ghaznavi, Shaheen 1 and 2), as its 
mainstay, and the less accurate liquid-fuel missiles (Ghauri 1 and 2) for long-range strikes 
against deep population centers in India. Pakistan is also working on a ground-launched cruise 
missile (GLCM), called the Babur, which was tested first in August 2005 and again in March 
2006. Table 2 lists the main air and missile delivery systems in Pakistan’s inventory. 
 
Aircraft / Missile Range Source Status 
 F-16 A/B 925 km United States 35 planes in inventory 
 Mirage 5 PA 1,300 km France 50 planes in inventory 
 Hatf 1 80—100 km Indigenous In service since mid-1990s 
 Hatf 2 (Abdali) 180 km Indigenous/China Tested in May 2002, in service 
 Hatf 3 (Ghaznavi) 300 km Indigenous/China M-11, tested May 2002, in service 
 Hatf 4 (Shaheen 1) 600—800 km Indigenous /China First tested October 2002, in service 
 Hatf 5 (Ghauri 1) 1,300—1,500 
km 
Indigenous/DPRK No Dong, tested May 2002, in service 
 Hatf 5 (Ghauri 2) 2,000 km Indigenous/DPRK No Dong, tested April 2002, in 
development 
 Hatf 6 (Shaheen 2)  2,000—2,500 
km 
Indigenous/China First tested March 2004, in development 
 Hatf 7 (Babur)  500 km GLCM Indigenous/China? First tested August 2005, in development 
                                                 
15 John Grevatt, “USAF Awards Lockheed Martin Pakistan’s F-16 Upgrade,” Jane’s Defence Industry, 1 January 
2007. 
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Table 2 Pakistani Nuclear Delivery Systems16 
 
Survivable Strategic Force 
Since the advent of Pakistan’s nuclear program, Pakistani officials have worried about 
preventative strikes against their nuclear production facilities and later against their concealed 
weapons arsenal. Concerns about the survivability of the nuclear program arose in the mid and 
late 1970s, when (following India’s first nuclear explosive test in May 1974) the U.S. 
government aggressively blocked Pakistan’s attempt to acquire nuclear technology from Europe. 
Pakistanis believed that Washington established the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) primarily to 
prevent them from going nuclear; meanwhile India’s nuclear status was accepted after the minor 
opprobrium it received following its surprise nuclear detonation. Even today Pakistanis cite as 
evidence of international discrimination against their nuclear effort the visit to Islamabad by U.S. 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in August 1976 to pressure President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to 
abandon the nuclear bomb development program, which was then at a very early stage. Kissinger 
offered 110 A-7 attack aircraft as compensation to reverse Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. 
Although Kissinger evidently did not issue a direct threat, to this date the Pakistani narrative 
consistently has maintained that Bhutto was threatened with severe consequences if he did not 
change the country’s nuclear policy.17 
Three years later, after U.S. President Jimmy Carter levied nuclear nonproliferation 
sanctions against Islamabad, Pakistani officials feared that the United States might conduct 
sabotage or air strikes against Pakistan’s uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta. In response, 
Pakistan tightened perimeter security and air defenses around the sensitive fissile material 
production facility. These fears were rekindled after Israel’s successful attack s on Iraq’s Osirak 
nuclear reactor in June 1981. Reportedly, in the same month, the Indian air force established 
contingency plans for attacking Kahuta, which the Indian government consistently has denied.18 
Alarm bells sounded once again in the mid-1980s over the prospect of Indian air attacks 
against Kahuta. Islamabad’s threat perceptions escalated in the summer of 1984 when the Indian 
army mounted military operations inside the sacred Golden Temple in Amritsar to suppress the 
Sikh crisis in Indian Punjab and also occupied the contested Siachen Glacier in the same month. 
A few years later, during the 1986-1987 Brasstacks military crisis, Pakistani fears of a preventive 
strike against Kahuta triggered even more serious concerns. By then, sufficient evidence had 
convinced the Pakistan leadership that Indian Army Chief General Sundarji was planning a 
preventive war against Pakistan in the shadow of military exercises along the border with the 
ultimate objectives of neutralizing Pakistan’s alleged support for the Sikh separation movement 
and dismantling Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.19 This crisis, which led to the partial 
                                                 
16 Information contained in the table is from various sources, including “Pakistan: Air Force,” Jane’s World Air 
Forces, 28 November 2006, and “Pakistan: Armed Forces,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: South Asia, 22 
November 2006, both subscription websites. 
17 Dennis Kux, United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson 
Center, 2001), 222. 
18 Milton R. Benjamin, “India Said to Eye Raid on Pakistan’s A-plants,” The Washington Post, 20 December 1982. 
19 Proliferation analyst George Perkovich has written that consideration of an attack on Pakistani nuclear facilities 
went all the way up to the most senior Indian policymakers in January 1987: “[Prime Minister] Rajiv [Gandhi] now 
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mobilization of troops on both sides of the border, finally subsided after President Zia ul-Haq 
met with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at a cricket match in Jaipur, India. 
 During the Kashmir uprising in the early 1990s, Pakistani policymakers once again 
became concerned about the security of their nuclear facilities, this time suspecting a joint 
Israeli-Indian preventive military attack. On this occasion, the Pakistani leadership of President 
Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and Army Chief General Aslam Beg 
decided to convey a clear threat to India that Pakistan would attack India’s key nuclear facilities 
outside of Bombay (the Bhabha Atomic Research Center and the Tarapur power reactors) if 
Kahuta were struck. Soon thereafter, the military crisis ended, although the violence in Kashmir 
persisted for well over a decade. Partly as a consequence of Pakistan’s nuclear policy 
reorientation during the 1990 crisis, the U.S. government invoked nonproliferation sanctions 
under the Pressler Amendment, which terminated all arms transfers and nearly all economic 
assistance to Pakistan throughout the decade of the 1990s. 
 Immediately after India conducted its surprise nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998, 
Pakistani policymakers became concerned about the possibility of an Indian or joint Indian-
Israeli attack on Pakistan’s nuclear production and storage facilities and its test site in 
Baluchistan. This threat perception was stimulated on a general level by the aggressive rhetoric 
of the new ruling party in India, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and more specifically by 
Pakistani intelligence reports of at least one Israeli aircraft that was observed operating on Indian 
territory during the period when Pakistan was preparing for its own nuclear test series. 
According to Pakistani defense analyst, Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “two intelligence reports 
appeared that caused much panic among Pakistan's policy makers. First, intelligence service and 
Army authorities reported the sighting of an unidentified F-16 aircraft in Pakistan's airspace on 
May 27 (it should be noted here that India does not have F-16 aircraft; Pakistani military 
authorities were suggesting the presence of an Israeli aircraft in the area). The country's Ghauri 
missiles were deployed that same day. The second report came shortly after midnight of May 27-
28. The Pakistani military was put on maximum alert when the country's intelligence agencies 
reported an unusual movement of aircraft in India just across the border, hinting at a possible 
preventive air strike against nuclear installations. The Pakistani press began to talk about the 
possibility of an Indian air strike on Pakistan's nuclear installations a couple of days before the 
security alert.”20 Ultimately, nothing came of these reports—except for the Pakistan 
government’s rush to demonstrate its nuclear weapons capability before something came up to 
prevent it from doing so. 
                                                                                                                                                             
considered the possibility that Pakistan might initiate war with India. In a meeting with a handful of senior 
bureaucrats and General Sundarji, he contemplated beating Pakistan to the draw by launching a preemptive attack on 
the Army Reserve South. This also would have included automatically an attack on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities to 
remove the potential for a Pakistani nuclear riposte to India’s attack. Relevant government agencies were not asked 
to contribute analysis or views to the discussion. Sundarji argued that India’s cities could be protected from a 
Pakistani counterattack (perhaps a nuclear one), but, upon being probed, could not say how. One important advisor 
from the Ministry of Defense argued eloquently that ‘India and Pakistan have already fought their last war, and there 
is too much to lose in contemplating another one.’ This view ultimately prevailed.” George Perkovich, India’s 
Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 280. See also 
Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2003), 92-95. 
20 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Testing,” Asian Survey, 41, no. 6 (November-December 2001): 943-55. 
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A few years later, in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks 
against the United States, Washington’s urgent response to take down Al Qaeda and the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan created new worries in Islamabad about preventive strikes against 
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. In a statement to the nation announcing Pakistan’s full cooperation 
with the U.S. war on terrorism and its sudden withdrawal of support for the Taliban, President 
Musharraf cited the protection of the country’s strategic assets as one of the main reasons for this 
policy reversal. As Musharraf has written in his memoir, “The security of our strategic assets 
would be jeopardized. We did not want to lose or damage the military parity that we had 
achieved with India by becoming a nuclear weapons state. It is no secret that the United States 
has never been comfortable with a Muslim country acquiring nuclear weapons, and the 
Americans undoubtedly would have taken the opportunity of an invasion to destroy such 
weapons. And India, needless to say, would have loved to assist the United States to the hilt.”21 
U.S. and Indian reactions to the events of 9-11 put Pakistan in a very precarious position in 
which its strategic assets and undoubtedly its overall sovereign integrity would have been 
threatened if it did not immediately and completely reverse its position toward the Taliban—
even though sacrificing the Taliban out of geopolitical exigencies created enormous domestic 
problems for the Musharraf government, and still complicates its ability to rule in the 
northwestern part of the country.22 
Fears of an Indian attack against Pakistan’s nuclear assets resurfaced once again during 
the military standoff with India following the 13 December 2001 terrorist attack against the 
Indian parliament building. This time, however, Pakistan mobilized its conventional forces and 
went into full operational alert. Nuclear weapons reportedly already had been dispersed after 
post-11 September crisis; but although the entire national security apparatus was placed on high 
alert, there were no reports of Pakistan mating nuclear weapons to delivery systems during this 
2001-2002 military standoff. 
Since the 1998 tests, various pronouncements, publications in the Western press, and 
events in the region have eroded the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear command and control, 
overshadowing the efforts that have been made since 1999 to harness a coherent command 
system to ensure management of its nuclear capabilities. The revelation of A. Q. Khan’s reckless 
secondary proliferation activities and information that two Pakistani atomic scientists met 
members of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan created further concerns over Pakistan’s nuclear security. 
Also, U.S. intelligence reportedly believed that Pakistan readied its nuclear arsenals to threaten 
India during the Kargil conflict created an overall impression of an irresponsible nuclear 
power.23 
Pakistani officials admit that many mistakes had been made, which allowed the A. Q. 
Khan saga to take place. But continuing criticism of its nuclear custodianship within Western 
                                                 
21 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, 202. 
22 For background, see Khawar Hussain, Pakistan’s Afghanistan Policy, Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
June 2005, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/Hussain05.pdf. 
23 See Scott D. Sagan, “Keeping the Bomb Away from Tehran,” Foreign Affairs 85, no 5 (September-October 
2006), pp. 51-54; Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy Democracy and the Bomb (Washington D.C.: The 
Brookings Institutions Press, 2004), pp. 166-7; and Bruce Riedel; “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil 
Summit at Blair House,” Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, Policy Paper Series, 
2002. 
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government and think tank circles feeds Pakistani fears of being targeted and labeled as an 
irresponsible state, not primarily due to its nuclear policy and custody shortcomings, which it 
believes it has corrected, but more as a conspiracy to keep the Pakistani nuclear program on the 
defensive. This “conspiracy” is viewed in Islamabad as an attempt to establish the grounds for 
rollback of its nuclear weapons program, harkening back to the U.S. position from the 1970s 
through the mid-1990s. These fears are further reinforced with Washington’s renewed global 
partnership with India, making Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal an exceptionally—perhaps 
even uniquely— “illegitimate” capability. 
 Today, the expanding U.S.-India strategic partnership, which goes well beyond the 
civilian nuclear cooperation deal, has rekindled concerns about a possible Indian preventive 
military attack, this time perhaps in collaboration with the United States. In response to the U.S.-
India announcement of civilian nuclear cooperation during President George Bush’s visit to India 
in March 2006, Pakistan’s National Command Authority publicly resolved that any deal that 
would shift the nuclear balance in South Asia would force Pakistan to re-evaluate its minimum 
nuclear deterrence requirements. One effect of Pakistan’s decades-old fears of preventive strikes 
against its nuclear complex has been a very high priority placed on the survivability of all 
nuclear production facilities, weapons and missile storage complexes, and potential launch 
facilities. Because of operational security concerns, no details have been revealed about the 
measures taken to ensure survivability, but presumably they involve an emphasis on mobile 
systems, camouflage, hardened and deeply buried facilities, and strict compartmentalization of 
information about the plans, locations, and standard operating procedures governing the 
movement, deployment, and possible employment of strategic forces. 
 
Responsive Strategic Command and Control System 
 President Pervez Musharraf announced the formal creation of Pakistan’s National 
Command Authority on 2 February 2000. Prior to this announcement, a de facto nuclear 
command and control arrangement existed as part of the national military command structure, 
which had provided—and continues to provide—guidance over conventional military operations. 
The new NCA operates much like the structure that preceded it, although its membership is more 
formally (and publicly) articulated, and at least one dedicated communications system reportedly 
has been created to enable the NCA to issue guidance to operational strategic forces during 
serious military crises and war. 
  The secretariat of the NCA is the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), located at the Joint 
Services Headquarters. SPD supports each of the two main elements of the NCA. The apex body 
is the Employment Control Committee (ECC), a senior leadership group comprising both 
military and civilian policymakers. This decision-making group provides policy direction and is 
the authority over strategic forces. This body is chaired by the President and also includes the 
Prime Minister (who is Vice Chairman), Foreign Minister (Deputy Chair), Ministers for Defense, 
Interior, and Finance, the three service chiefs, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Committee (JCSC), and of course the Director General of SPD (who serves as the organization’s 
secretary). The Finance Minister was not on the original ECC approved by Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif. He was added shortly after Musharraf assumed control of the government in 
October 1999. 
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The membership of the ECC has undergone some change even after the Pakistan 
Government announced it publicly in February 2000. When Musharraf first talked openly about 
the NCA, he was then Chief Executive of the country, and he indicated that the chair of the NCA 
would be the head of the government. Then after the October 2002 elections, when Zafarullah 
Khan Jamali became Prime Minister, Musharraf announced that the chair of the NCA would 
become the President, a post he then occupied, and that the vice-chair would be the Prime 
Minister. 
 The subordinate body of the NCA is the Developmental Control Committee (DCC), 
which is comprised of military and scientific elements and is tasked to optimize the technical and 
financial efficiency of the entire program to implement the strategic force goals set by the 
Employment Control Committee. This group is also chaired by the President and includes the 
Prime Minister (Vice Chairman), the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (Deputy 
Chair), the three service chiefs, the heads of the concerned strategic-scientific organizations, and 
the Director General of SPD (Secretary). In practice, the DCC is chaired by the DG-SPD, and the 
operational directors of each of the military services attend in place of the service chiefs. 
The organizational diagram of the NCA appears in the following graphic. 
 
 
Graphic 1 Pakistan National Command Authority 
 
The A.Q. Khan crisis has galvanized the Pakistani command and control system in ways 
Pakistani policymakers could not have predicted. In this instance, it was indeed true that a crisis 
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contained both grave danger and tremendous opportunity. Out of a strange combination of 
necessity and desire, the military moved very quickly to tighten its grip on all of the country’s 
strategic and scientific organizations in a professional manner—bringing about more coherence 
among the military planners, operators, and scientific bodies. Meanwhile, the three armed 
services continue to build and train strategic forces with a great deal of secrecy and 
compartmentalization. However, Pakistan has continued with the same personnel under the 
leadership of SPD Director General Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, who remains the focal point of all 
nuclear matters in Pakistan. 
Since the A.Q. Khan affair, the Strategic Plans Division has gone to great lengths to 
improve the country’s command and control infrastructure. One of the greatest flaws in the 
system was the lack of formal oversight over the strategic scientific organizations. The security 
setup arranged since the beginning of the program was designed to protect it from outside 
interference, spying, and physical threats (including sabotage). There was no formal reporting 
channel of the security apparatus that could have the ability to account for shipments (in and 
out), personal travels, etc. Also, there was no formalized procedure of nuclear material 
protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A).24 The nuclear security and safety aspect was 
always believed to be the highly classified national secret because it revealed the capacity and 
capability of the country. This was a fatal flaw in the system, which SPD had grappled with since 
its formation.25  
SPD placed particular emphasis on enhancement of its security division. Lt. Gen. Kidwai 
appointed a dedicated two-star general to head this vital part of the organization and expanded it 
to include approximately 8,000 military personnel. A separate security directorate for counter 
intelligence was formulated, headed by a one-star brigadier general. This organization essentially 
coordinates with all intelligence agencies about any external threats. The Inter-Services 
Intelligence Directorate (ISID) forms the outermost ring of security and works closely with the 
security division. Prior to this, there was not formal role for the ISID in nuclear matters. Even 
now, the ISID director general is not a formal member of the National Command Authority. 
(Reportedly, he is a regularly invited member.) Since the whole SPD organization falls under the 
Joint Services Headquarters, the overall responsibility of nuclear safety and security rests with 
the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Committee. The chairman represents the highest level of 
joint military integration for national security intelligence and articulation of the nuclear 
command authority. See graphic 2 for an organizational diagram of SPD. 
 
                                                 
24 For background, see Nathan E. Busch, No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004). 
25 For background, see Peter R. Lavoy and Feroz Hassan Khan, “Rogue or Responsible Nuclear Power? Making 




Graphic 2 Strategic Plans Division 
 
 
Impact of U.S.-India Strategic Cooperation on Pakistan 
 The growing strategic cooperation between the United States and India has caused some 
consternation in Islamabad, even though Pakistani policymakers have not made a public hue and 
cry over the issue. Three potential implications of expanded nuclear and defense cooperation 
between Washington and New Delhi are particularly troubling—not as immediate concerns, but 
more as long-term threats that need to be monitored and countered. 
 
1. India may be able to out race Pakistan by rapidly expanding its production of fissile 
material. 
The most widely discussed implication for Pakistani security of the U.S.-India civil 
nuclear cooperation accord is the potential it provides for India to divert more of its indigenously 
produced nuclear fuel to the weapons program because of the likely boost in international 
supplies of fuel for India’s civil nuclear power program. Both the Indian government and the 
Bush administration deny that this will be the case. For example, U.S. Under Secretary of State 
Nicholas Burns told reporters on 2 March 2006 that the agreement would not have an impact on 
India’s strategic program.26 However, Pakistanis may believe that unless India stops production 
                                                 
26 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Briefing by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nick 
Burns,” Maurya Sheraton Hotel and Towers, New Delhi, India, 2 March 2006. 
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of fissile material for weapons purposes—which it shows no interest in doing—nuclear 
safeguards will do little to ensure that outside assistance is not diverted. 
The problem as viewed in Islamabad is exacerbated by tendency of Pakistan’s military 
and political leaders to view everything related to India in zero-sum terms—a particularly 
dangerous state of affairs considering India’s growing economic and military might and its 
significantly enhanced political capital in the United States, Europe, China, and elsewhere. 
Pakistani defense planners have shown little willingness to accommodate India’s growing 
regional preeminence. They say that what is required are firm assurances that India will respect 
Pakistan’s independence and territorial integrity—or, to put it more colorfully, to prevent the 
transformation of Pakistan into a weak, subservient “West Bangladesh.” However, the main 
“dilemma” of Pakistan’s security predicament is that no Pakistani leader has ever been able to 
articulate what kind of assurances are required of India to reassure Pakistan that India accepts its 
existence as a permanent nation-state. 
Although Indian government officials deny that they have any interest in significantly 
expanding their fissile material production capabilities, because of Pakistan’s intense insecurity 
complex, there is a tendency in Islamabad to listen to and accept as true the aggressive and 
sometimes hegemonic claims of India’s defense hawks such as Brahma Chellaney and Bharat 
Karnad—the latter of which has been a particularly vocal critic of India’s minimum deterrent 
posture, arguing for a force of at least four SSBNs armed with 48 SLBMs, 25 nuclear-armed 
ICBMs, 40 nuclear IRBMs, and 70 manned nuclear-delivery aircraft, all to be complemented by 
another 70 nuclear-equipped air-to-surface missiles and 25 demolition munitions.27 While all 
objective evidence would suggest that the Indian government does not pay very close attention to 
Chellaney, Karnad, and other hawks, at least on the issue of nuclear force levels, inside the 
Pakistani strategic community these views are taken as a rough blueprint for India’s force 
development. In the absence of reliable intelligence on many crucial strategic maters, worst-case 
analysis usually guides policymaking. 
Compounding the problem is another tendency of Pakistani military officials to also pay 
close attention to the debate in the United States over strategic matters in South Asia. The 
incredible publicity over the U.S.-India initiative for civilian nuclear cooperation has provided an 
abundance of grist for the worst-case analysis mill in Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In 2006, for 
example, Robert Einhorn has stated, “the deal appears to give India complete freedom not just to 
continue but to expand its production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.” Joe Cirincione has 
been even more blunt: “President Bush has now given away the store. He did everything but 
actually sell nuclear weapons to India.” Cirincione added: “If the deal stands, India will use 
foreign fuel for its power reactors, freeing up Indian uranium for its military reactors. India will 
be able to double or triple the number of weapons it can make annually. They could go from the 
6-10 they could currently produce to 30 a year.”28 
Regardless if this prediction is merited or not, Pakistani strategic planners almost 
certainly put a great deal of stock in this calculation when they reviewed the implications of the 
U.S.-India nuclear deal for their own strategic requirements in a combined National Command 
                                                 
27 Bharat Karnad, “A Thermonuclear Deterrent,” in India’s Nuclear Deterrent, ed. Amitabh Matoo (New Delhi: 
Har-Anand Publications, 1999). 
28 Joseph Cirincione, “Oh Canada!” The Globe and Mail, 11 March 2006, available at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18116. 
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Authority meeting on 12 April 2006. During this meeting, Pakistan’s strategic leadership 
probably concluded that Pakistan’s own fissile material production plan required some 
adjustment—possibly to include the acquisition of an additional fissile material production 
facility to compensate for India’s presumed expansion of fissile material production. Recent 
public reports about the expansion of Pakistan’s plutonium production and reprocessing 
capabilities, if true, would seem to be further evidence of this development.29 
 
2. India may be able to identify and target Pakistan’s strategic assets with its enhanced 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and it may be able to reach 
and destroy Pakistani strategic assets using its improved precision-strike aircraft and missile 
capabilities. 
As discussed above, Pakistani defense planners have long been concerned about the 
survivability of their nuclear weapons production facilities and weapons arsenal. Although there 
were many scares about possible Indian preventive strikes—either alone or in combination with 
some outside power—Pakistani officials probably recognized that India’s ability to locate key 
strategic targets and then mount precision attacks against them was relatively limited. India 
simply did not possess either the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems or 
precision strike capabilities to perform this kind of mission with a high confidence of success. 
However, because of India’s expanding international defense relationships, especially with the 
United States, this situation is changing. 
India is placing a real priority on developing and acquiring foreign weapons systems to 
deter aggressive actions from both China and Pakistan. To improve its ISR capabilities, India has 
purchased or is in negotiation for the Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), 
surveillance radars, weapon locating radars, maritime surveillance aircraft, unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs), and satellites. In the area of precision strike, India’s priorities have been on 
acquiring the new models of the Su-30MKI and Mirage 2000-5 aircraft, upgrading the Jaguar 
and the MiG-27 jets, acquiring and developing anti-tank guided-weapon systems, guided artillery 
weapons, multi-purpose guided weapons, and the Rafael listening targeting pod.30 
 The ISR and precision strike systems mentioned above are expected to provide India with 
the ability to dissuade and deter its potential attackers by helping achieve a military edge over 
Pakistan and by helping bridge a quality gap between the Chinese military and the Indian 
military. The modern technology is expected to improve the ability of the Indian armed forces to 
survey potential threats to Indian security and to respond to them in a timely and effective 
manner. The ISR systems will provide an improved capability to detect and track enemy 
infiltration, and will also provide improved queuing for patrolling assets to engage the enemy. 
Having precision strike capability will then allow Indian forces to effectively engage and 
neutralize the enemy with a high degree of success. Having an improved ISR, precision strike, 
and missile defense capability is expected to dissuade and deter a potential enemy by ensuring its 
                                                 
29 For example, see David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Chashma Nuclear Site in Pakistan with Possible 
Reprocessign Plant,” Institute for Science and International Security report, 18 January 2007, http://www.isis-
online.org/publications/southasia/chashma.pdf. 
30 Lt. General R.K. Jasbir Singh, PVSM, ed. Indian Defense Yearbook 2004, (Dehra Dun, India: Natraj Publishers, 
2004). 
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detection and punishment, and a successful defense against a missile attack is expected to deter 
the enemy form launching an attack in the first place. 
This pattern of arms acquisition by India has been a serious concern for Pakistan. 
Predictably, Islamabad is likely to view India’s recent modernization efforts as a significant 
threat to its security. India’s military modernization program has led to a growing disparity 
between the Indian and Pakistani conventional military capabilities. A particularly grave concern 
is that if India pursues its policy to achieve technical superiority in ISR and precision targeting, 
this will provide India the capability to effectively locate and efficiently destroy strategically 
important targets in Pakistan. India’s new-found ISR capability, through its acquisition of the 
Phalcon AWACS, will provide India with the ability to locate targets deep inside Pakistan’s 
territory, and direct India’s superior aircraft, such as the Su-30 and the Mirage 2000-5, with their 
air-to-air and precision strike capabilities, onto those targets. Possessing advanced precision 
strike capability will ensure high probability of kill, and put Pakistan at a significant 
disadvantage. The result of this growing divergence in the two states’ conventional capabilities 
will be either a regional arms race—as Pakistan desperately attempts to keep pace with India in 
order to deter a preventive strike from India—and/or a lowering of the nuclear threshold for 
Pakistan—if it fails to keep up the conventional arms race with an economically powerful India 
and therefore needs to rely on its nuclear arsenal for a deterrent. 
How this issue will play out in the coming years remains to be seen, but suffice it to say 
that Pakistani defense planners have considerable cause for concern as they project the evolving 
security environment over the next one-to-two decades. This concern is not particularly evident 
from the rhetoric of the government. For example, President Musharraf remarked in December 
2006: “If we look at the unconventional mode then Pakistan is a nuclear power. We have tested 
our whole missile power and the security and safety of our missile system is that much strong 
that if any nuclear attack is done on Pakistan, it will not be affected. So I am sure that there is no 
threat against Pakistan and Pakistani nation is fully prepared to face any threat.”31 Despite the 
positive spin, it seems likely that Pakistani officials are growing increasingly concerned about 
the long-term survivability of their strategic deterrent owing to India’s improving ISR and 
precision-strike capabilities. 
 
3. The U.S. government, which seemingly places more value on its strategic, economic, and 
political relations with India, may be more inclined to side with India in future regional 
disputes, continuing a trend that began with the Kargil conflict in the summer of 1999. 
The final implication considered here of the expanding U.S. strategic relationship with 
India for Pakistan’s security is the most difficult to define with any precision. It is a more general 
apprehension held by many Pakistani defense decision-makers that Washington’s views on 
South Asian affairs will increasingly be shaped by India’s perceptions and arguments, rather than 
by a cool, objective determination by U.S. policymakers. 
                                                 





The Pakistani commentators who have expressed this concern have pointed to different 
causal dynamics. These range from the benign—a shift in U.S. perceptions that could result from 
the greater degree of Indian inputs coming into the U.S. system due to the heightened strategic 
interaction between U.S. and Indian policymakers and military officers—to the sinister—the 
possible tendency of U.S. officials to take a pro-Indian line because of the growing economic 
interaction between the two countries and the much higher money and rewards at stake than ever 
was the case in South Asia. 
No matter what the driving force is—or is thought to be—and notwithstanding 
Washington’s repeated reminders that the U.S. strategic relationship with Pakistan continues to 
be of vital importance to U.S. security interests, Pakistan’s concern of becoming strategically 
isolated—as it was in the late 1970s and throughout the 1990s—is likely to intensify as the U.S.-
India strategic relationship continues to grow. How this plays out in Islamabad’s general foreign 
policy orientation and in its strategic policies remains to be seen. 
